Abstract
Judicial review is a central feature of India’s constitutional framework, enabling courts to ensure that legislative and executive actions conform to constitutional mandates. This paper examines the role of the Supreme Court of India in strengthening judicial review through its interpretative authority and constitutional jurisprudence. It traces the evolution of judicial review from the Court’s early deferential approach in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras to the transformative expansion of rights in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and the entrenchment of constitutional limits through the basic structure doctrine in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. The study highlights how judicial review has been instrumental in protecting fundamental rights, particularly under Article 21, and in preserving constitutional supremacy against legislative and executive excesses. At the same time, it critically engages with debates on judicial activism, democratic accountability, and separation of powers. The paper argues that while judicial review has significantly strengthened India’s constitutional democracy, its continued legitimacy depends on principled adjudication, institutional restraint, and respect for democratic processes.